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Abstract 
 
We analyze the implications of optimal price and quality choices by 
efficiency-heterogeneous firms, for the sorting of workers with different skills 
into firms with different characteristics. Under very reasonable assumptions, 
the model provides an integrated explanation within a competitive framework 
for the observed correlations between several establishment characteristics 
(size, employees’ average education, capital/labor ratio, and remoteness of 
selling markets) and average wages. We test the model’s implications using 
Spanish employer-employee matched data that allow to simultaneously 
control for establishment and worker characteristics. We find that average 
education in the establishment is increasing in the remoteness of its main 
market. Establishment size, remoteness of main market, and coworkers’ 
average education have significant, robust and quantitatively important 
positive joint effects on wages. The national-market orientation effect on 
labor composition and on wages (with respect to local-market orientation) is 
at least as important as the international-market effect (with respect to 
national-market orientation). All establishment wage premia are non-
decreasing on worker education and most of them are strictly increasing. 
Keywords: Quality Competition, Exporting Firms, Unobservable Skills, 
Wages. (JEL: J24, J31, I20). 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
There is by now a sizeable empirical literature pointing out that some characteristics of firms are 
associated with large average wages. In particular, it has been claimed that large establishments, 
exporters, firms with high capital/labor ratio, and firms with high average-education employees 
pay higher wages. Yet we are still far away from being confident that we fully understand the 
mechanisms for these establishment wage effects. For instance, formal explanations for these 
establishment-characteristics wage premia have focused on the firm-size effect and have not 
provided a simple framework that captures all of them. Moreover, as we will argue below, the 
empirical evidence offered so far is still weak in several respects.1
 
In this paper we build a simple model analyzing the implications of optimal output-quality 
choices by efficiency-heterogeneous firms, for the sorting of workers with different skills into 
firms with different characteristics. Under very reasonable assumptions, the model is able to 
provide an integrated explanation within the competitive framework for all the cited correlations 
between establishment characteristics and wages. In the empirical part of the paper, we test the 
model’s implications thereby providing a joint reassessment of the relationships between 
establishment characteristics and establishment labor composition and wages, and extending the 
evidence in several directions. 
 
As already noted, in our model firms differ in efficiency and choose prices as well as quality, 
whereas workers differ by measured education and unmeasured skills (which, notwithstanding, are 
observable by firms). Under very reasonable assumptions, optimal decisions on quality imply that 
workers with more education and higher unmeasured skills are sorted into more efficient firms, 
which in turn sell in more distant markets and are larger in equilibrium. As a result, the model 
predicts that we should observe: (1) average education of employees tends to be higher in larger 
firms and firms selling in more distant markets; (2) firms with higher average education, larger 
size or selling in more distant markets pay higher average wages (even after controlling for 
                                                 
1 Abowd and Kramarz (1999) is a general survey on studies linking firm and worker data. The existence 
of a positive firm-size wage premium is probably the most extensively documented firm characteristic effect 
and has been analyzed among others by Idson and Oi (1999) and Troske (1999). Oi and Idson (1999), and 
Lallemand, Plasman, and Rycx (2005) provide reviews of the theoretical arguments and the empirical 
results. The hypothesis that exporter firms pay larger wages has also received extensive treatment by a 
recent literature starting with Bernard and Jensen (1995), which is surveyed in Schank, Schnabel and 
Wagner (2006). The effect of average coworkers’ education on individual wages is analyzed in Bayard and 
Troske (1999), Troske (1999), and in Battu, Belfield and Sloane (2003). High complementarity between 
skilled workers (Kremer (1993) and Kremer and Maskin (1996)) has been suggested as a possible 
explanation for this effect. Finally, for the relationship between the capital/labor ratio and average wages in 
the establishment see Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis (1999), Troske (1999), and Arai (2003). 
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workers’ education). The model also points out the relevant parameters determining the 
relationship between firm’s capital/labor ratio and the observed average wages (conditional on 
education) it pays, and predicts that whatever the sign of the relationship between establishment-
characteristics wage effects and worker education, the sign should be the same for all 
establishment characteristics. 
 
The model can be related to the recent literature that emphasizes efficiency heterogeneity at 
the firm level to explain several important facts related to international trade and the dynamics of 
aggregate productivity (Melitz (2003), and Bernard et al. (2003)). As in those papers, the existence 
of trade costs in our model induce only the most productive firms to self-select into exporters. The 
paper can thus be seen as exploring the implications of firm-efficiency heterogeneity on labor 
sorting and the wage structure in a consistent way with that literature. 
 
In the second part of the paper, we test the implications of the model using Spanish data from 
the 2002 Encuesta de Estructura Salarial (Survey on the Wage Structure). This survey contains 
matched data for more than 150,000 workers and 15,000 establishments, and includes most 
relevant characteristics of individuals (such as education, genre, age, years in the current firm, type 
of contract, etc.) and establishments (location, industry, size, market orientation, etc.). We explain 
the details on the data and the sample being used in Section 3. 
 
In Section 4 we use these data to analyze the model’s implications on the relationship between 
establishment characteristics (establishment main market –or market orientation- and size) and the 
educational composition of its labor force. Bernard and Jensen (1997) provide evidence that the 
ratio of non-production to production workers is larger in exporting firms. Similarly, Maurin, 
Thesmar, and Thoenig (2002) argue that the tasks related to product development, marketing, and 
customizing have a potentially very different content depending on whether they are performed for 
the domestic or the foreign market, so that the very act of exporting requires a skill upgrading of 
these activities. Using data on the occupational structure, they show that the fraction of high-skill 
jobs increases with the share of exported output, particularly in the development/marketing areas. 
Our data allow us to distinguish between not only exporters and non-exporters, but between 
establishments whose main market is either the local, the national, the European Union, or the rest 
of the world (non-EU countries) market. Our results also show that average education in 
establishments whose main market is the European Union is greater than in establishments 
oriented to the domestic market. The difference is still larger when comparing establishments 
whose main market is the rest of the world with domestic-market oriented establishments. 
However, there is also a substantial difference in average education between local-market 
establishments and national-market establishments that has not been uncovered so far. This 
difference is larger than the difference between national-market and European-market 
establishments, and is at least as important as the difference between national-market and rest of 
the world-market establishments. We obtain similar results using the fraction of college graduates 
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in the establishment instead of the mean of employees’ years of schooling. Thus, it appears to be 
more of a sequence of echelons in the effect of market orientation (from the local to the national 
market, and then to the European and to the world market) than a binary exporting versus non-
exporting effect. The effect is just increasing in the remoteness of the markets being served, as 
predicted by the model. In fact, the difference in efficiency needed for a firm to move on from the 
local market to the national market might be at least as large as the difference to become an 
exporter. Finally, we find that in the case of establishments oriented to non-local markets, larger 
firms also employ higher average-education workers. 
 
In Section 5 we test the model’s implications on wages controlling simultaneously for all the 
usual worker characteristics and the cited establishment characteristics. Analyses of the firm-size 
wage premium typically fail to control for market orientation (or for the less demanding exporting 
status variable) with which firm size is highly correlated. Moreover, the common shortcoming to 
almost all studies on the exporting status wage premium is that they use average data at the plant 
or firm level and therefore cannot control for individual worker characteristics. Since, as we 
already noted, employees’ average education is positively correlated with the exporting status, the 
results are likely to be biased. The exception is Schank, Schnabel and Wagner (2006) who use 
linked employer-employee data from Germany. However, these authors rely on imputed data for 
white-collar workers and obtain some rather debatable results, as we will argue. 
 
In this section we show that all the variables suggested by the theoretical model have the 
expected signs, are jointly statistically significant, and have an important quantitative impact. 
According to our preferred estimation, workers in establishments whose main market is the 
national market obtain average wages 10.5-percent higher than wages in local-market 
establishments. This wage premium rises to 18.1-percent and to 20.3-percent, respectively, when 
the main market is either the EU or the rest of the world. Thus, as with the analysis on 
establishments’ labor composition, the national-market wage premium (with respect to local-
market establishments) is at least as important as the international-market premium (with respect 
to national-market establishments), which again has been the only one analyzed so far by the 
literature. Including all of our establishment characteristics in the wage equation reduces the 
coefficient on worker’s years of schooling by more than one third, which is consistent with the 
common presumption that education coefficients partially capture the effect of unmeasured skills. 
Working in establishments with the good characteristics (those that our model associates with high 
skills sorting) brings about a wage premium that is almost comparable to the education premium. 
For example, according to our preferred model estimates, working in a medium size establishment 
whose main market is the national market brings about the same wage premium (23.9-percent) 
over the reference group (small local establishments) than 5.2 additional years of schooling. The 
results are robust to changing the way in which individuals’ education as well as establishments’ 
average education are measured in the model, and to the inclusion of proxies controlling for other 
possible effects that have been suggested by the literature. More specifically, we include proxies 
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for the potential bargaining power of workers and unions and for the effect of internal labor 
markets, which have been argued to be more significant in large establishments. 
 
In the last subsection of Section 5 we address the question of whether establishment-
characteristics wage premia show any specific pattern with respect to worker education. We find 
that all the establishment characteristics have positive and significant wage effects for all 
education groups, and that these effects are non-decreasing in education in all cases and strictly 
increasing in most of them.2 For example, the coefficients on coworkers’ average education and on 
establishment’s market orientation obtained for the sub-sample of college graduates double and in 
some cases triple the coefficients obtained for the sub-sample of workers not having completed 
secondary studies. This brings about very large establishment wage premia for college graduates. 
For instance, we may consider the case of a college graduate employed in a medium-size 
establishment exporting most of its production to the European Union and with coworkers’ 
average education in the 75th percentile of the corresponding distribution. On average, this type of 
worker obtains a wage 86.4-percent higher than an individual with the same education who works 
in a small local-market establishment situated in the 25th percentile of the distribution on 
establishments’ average-education. The same comparison of establishment characteristics but for 
workers without completed secondary studies brings about a premium of 29.8-percent. These 
results suggest that unmeasured skills are much more valuable in the case of high-education 
workers. In Section 6 of the paper we summarize and conclude. 
 
 
2. THE MODEL 
 
In this Section we build a partial equilibrium model where efficiency-heterogeneous firms choose 
prices as well as quality to sell in different markets, and employ workers with heterogeneous 
measured and unmeasured characteristics (education and other skills, respectively). We analyze 
the relationships between the firm’s equilibrium characteristics (such as size and exporting status) 
and its labor composition and average wages, which have not been explored in the previous short 
literature of models with varying levels of output quality and labor skills (Stokey (1991), and 
Gabszewicz and Turrini (2000)). 
 
Demand and Technology 
 
Firms are indexed by j and may sell their output in different markets indexed by h. Consumers are 
identical in all markets but markets may differ in size. Mh is the size of market h (i.e., the number 
                                                 
2 These results are in contrast with the short preliminary evidence on this issue obtained with less rich data 
sets (see Battu, Belfield and Sloane (2003), Lallemand, Plasman and Rycx (2005), and Shank, Schnabel and 
Wagner (2006)). It may be noted however that except in the case of the first paper, these papers distinguish 
between blue-collard and white-collard workers instead of between workers with different education levels. 
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of consumers). Demand for firm j in market h, , depends on firm’s price  and quality ≥1 
in that market, and on market size according to the following inverse demand function: 
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Output is obtained by using capital and labor, which in turn may be educated or non-educated, 
and skilled or unskilled. Skill is the characteristic representing workers’ productive capacities that 
are observable by firms but are unmeasured by conventional statistics (so that we cannot control 
for them in the empirical analysis). Education is observable by firms and measured by statistics. 
Hence possible combinations sum up to four types of workers:  is the number of educated and 
skilled workers employed by firm j,  are the non-educated and skilled workers,  are the 
educated and unskilled workers, and  are the non-educated and unskilled workers. We also use 
the following notation: , , . Firm j has the following 
production function, which for any given choice of output quality is a conventional CES 
production function: 
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where  is the firm-specific efficiency parameter. The specific property of this function is that 
increasing output quality comes at the cost of lower output per worker. Moreover, it may be 
reasonable to think that producing higher quality goods out of unskilled and uneducated labor may 
be increasingly difficult. Unskilled non-educated work becomes a decreasingly good substitute for 
skills and education when it comes at producing higher quality. We formalize this idea by 
jA
                                                 
3 The assumption that  is just a normalization on quality. We take q=1 to be the minimum 
quality for the good to be of any use (so that demand is strictly positive at a zero price if and only quality is 
above this level). The condition  on the curvature of the (per capita) inverse demand 
function
( ) 00)1( =+ σδ
2'/'')/( <− σσhhj My
σ is the standard assumption that guarantees the second order conditions of profit maximization. 
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assuming that productivity of unskilled and uneducated labor decreases faster than that of skilled 
and educated labor, as quality increases:4
 
.; NUEUESNUNSES γγγγγγ <<<<  
 
Production and Transportation Costs 
 
Interest rate (plus physical-capital depreciation rate) and wages are taken as given by firms, and 
are denoted by r, , , , and .NUw NSw EUw ESw 5 We assume ,iUiS ww > NEi ,= . Minimizing the cost 
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i
i
i
jjj wlrKqyC ∑+=),( j,qj) subject to the production function, yields 
the following FOC: 
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Computing the cost function for optimal input choices is also standard: 
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Note that 0)(' >jqφ and 0)('' >jqφ . 
                                                 
4 Usually, devoting more time per unit of output is not sufficient to produce higher quality output. It is also 
indispensable to use above-average skills (besides having the appropriate education). For example, it is 
unlikely that a low skilled architect is able to design innovative solutions to outstanding architectural 
problems whatever the time provided for the project; similarly, it is unlikely that the service provided in a 
top restaurant by a highly skilled waiter can be matched by low skilled waiters just by increasing the number 
of these. In such cases, unskilled workers’ marginal productivity goes to zero as the quality being targeted 
increases. In fact, in previous models (Stokey (1991), and Gabszewicz and Turrini (2000)) goods of a given 
quality can only be produced by workers with certain minimum human capital. In our model we only set the 
weaker assumption that output per worker decreases faster for unskilled and non-educated labor than for 
skilled and educated one, when quality is increased.  
5 Assuming that different firms have different access to financial markets (i.e., they face different interest 
rates rj) would have similar implications than those stemming from differences in the efficiency parameter 
Aj.  
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So far, the costs we have considered involve only production costs. Nevertheless, selling in 
different markets involves market-specific transportation, logistics, and other non-production 
costs. We assume that selling in market h implies an additional cost τh per unit of output. In 
general, we may expect this cost to be increasing in the remoteness of market h, though τh is likely 
to be far from linear in distance.6 Thus, firm j’s cost of producing and selling  units of quality 
 in market h is:  
h
jy
h
jq
 
(5) .
)(
),( ⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡ += h
j
h
jh
j
h
j
h
j
h
j A
q
yqyC τφ  
 
Equilibrium 
 
For each possible market, firm j profit maximization subject to the demand function (1) implies 
the following FOC that determine the optimal values  and : *hjy
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Assuming jA/)1(')1(' φδ > , equation (6) has a solution , which is unique and 
independent of the market. Since 
1* >jq
0)('' ≤qδ  and 0)('' >qφ , equation (6) implies that higher 
efficiency firms choose higher quality in equilibrium: 
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6 The rise in costs per unit of output when selling in more distant markets may involve important 
discontinuities. Exporting may imply a discrete jump in costs due to additional administrative procedures, 
tariffs, use of foreign languages, etc. Similarly (though often overlooked), the cost increase when a 
previously local firm goes on to start selling in the national market may also be significant. This move 
typically involves a new logistic echelon between production and retailing, implying qualitatively new needs 
in terms of inventory, warehousing, material handling, packaging, information, and transportation. As 
observed in the Introduction, in the empirical part of this paper we distinguish between firms selling most of 
their output in the local, the domestic, the European Union or the rest of the world markets. 
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A necessary and sufficient condition for firms to be active in a given market h (i.e., ) 
is 
0* >hjy
( ) ( ) hjjj qAq τφσδ −−+ )(/10)( ** >0.7 In such a case, equation (7) holds, which in turn implies 
that more efficient firms will be larger (in terms of output) in every market where they are active:8
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Note that this result is obtained in spite of more efficient firms be producing higher quality output. 
In fact, producing higher quality does not imply selling at higher prices. This can be observed in 
the following expression whose sign is undefined: 
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For example, if inverse demand is inelastic to quality (small 'δ ) and rather convex (high ''σ ), 
higher-efficiency firms will tend to sell higher-quality goods at lower prices than firms producing 
lower-quality goods (this may happen since consumers are implicitly assumed to be willing to pay 
for diversity). Moreover, it may occur that a firm sets a higher price than a lower-efficiency firm 
does in a given market, and a lower price in a different market.9 This casts some doubts on the use 
of prices as proxies for quality in empirical studies. 
 
Labor Sorting and Average Wages  
 
From the FOC in (3) and assuming interior equilibria ( ; i=N,E; h=U,S), we obtain that 
for both education groups the ratio of skilled workers will be larger in firms producing higher 
quality: 
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Similarly, we have 
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From this last expression and assuming ,Nj
NS
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E
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ES
j llll // ≥ 10 we obtain that the ratio of educated 
workers  is also larger in firms producing higher quality: j
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Now, since more efficient firms produce higher quality, equations (11) and (12) imply that 
more efficient firms use a larger proportion of skilled workers within each education group, and a 
larger proportion of high-education workers with respect to their total employment: 
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Let  denote the average wage paid by firm j to workers with education level i: ijw
 
                                                 
10 It is seems unanimously agreed that unmeasured skills and education are positively correlated since skills 
can be very useful in achieving a high level of formal education. Hence the fraction of skilled workers that 
are educated should be larger than the fraction on unskilled that are educated. 
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Since >1,iUiS ww / NEi ,= , and using (13) we obtain that more efficient firms pay higher 
average wages at every education level: 
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Note that the positive relationship between efficiency and average wages depends crucially on the 
endogenous positive relationship between efficiency and quality. Should we assume that output 
quality is exogenous and the same for all firms, firms would choose the same labor composition 
no matter their level of efficiency. 
 
Firm Characteristics and Average Wages 
 
As noticed above, in equilibrium, not all firms will be active in all markets. Let 0>hA  denote 
the minimum efficiency level for a firm to find it profitable to be active in market h. This 
threshold is given by the value of the efficiency parameter implying zero profits per unit of output 
at the maximum possible price (i.e., for ), given optimal quality decisions 0=hjy )(* hhj Aq  and 
transport cost to market h: 
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Thus if firm j’ sells in market h’ but firm j’’ does not, it must be the case that '''' jhj AAA ≥> . As 
expected, the efficiency threshold hA  for being active in market h is increasing in the cost of 
bringing the product to that market:  
 
(16) .0))((/)(/ *2 >=∂∂ hhjhhh AqAA φτ  
 
As a result, the remoteness of the markets where a firm sells in is informative about its higher 
efficiency. This also has implications on firm size. We already noted that more efficient firms 
have larger sales in every market. Now, since more efficient firms also sell in a larger number of 
markets, their total size in terms of total output, ∑ <∈= }:{ jh AAhh hjj yy , is also larger. 
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As noted in the Introduction, there is also some empirical evidence on a positive relationship 
between the capital/labor ratio and average wages. In our model, this relationship depends on the 
technological assumptions about the relationship between quality and physical capital. A sufficient 
condition for quality and the capital/labor ratio to be positively related is (to see this, just 
follow the argument used to obtain (11) and (12)). Under this condition, the capital/labor ratio 
would be positively associated with high average wages for every education level. We will not 
pursue this issue in the empirical part of the paper, however, since our data set does not include 
information about establishments’ physical capital. 
ESK γγ ≤
 
The general implication of the model is that under very reasonable assumptions quality 
competition implies that more skilled and educated workers are sorted into more efficient firms. 
The reason is that in equilibrium more efficient firms choose to produce higher quality goods. 
Since in equilibrium, more efficient firms also tend to have larger size and sell in more distant 
markets,11 we should observe that: first, average education of employees tends to be higher in 
larger firms and firms selling in more distant markets; and second, firms with higher average 
education, larger size and selling in more distant markets tend to pay higher average wages to 
every education group. We empirically test these hypotheses in the following sections. 
 
A final question is which pattern, if any, do firm-characteristics wage premia have with 
respect to worker’s education. This amounts to ascertaining the sign of . As can 
it be observed in expression (17) below this sign depends on most parameters of the model as well 
as on the distribution of skills in every education group and the differences in wages, on which we 
can only make conjectures. In any event, the sign will tend to be positive the larger are the 
differences in productivity within educated workers (between skilled and unskilled educated 
workers) with respect to the difference within non-educated workers (i.e., the larger the ratio 
j
N
j
E
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11 This is consistent with the general conclusions of Bernard and Jensen (1999) and the large literature 
surveyed by Wagner (2005) on the main direction of causality between efficiency and the exporting status. 
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Moreover, the model predicts that the differences between education groups in the wage effects of 
firm characteristics should be of the same sign for all firm characteristics. The reason is that given 
any sign for  in (17), the sign of the relationship between Aj
N
j
E
j dAwwd /)/( j and any of the firm 
characteristics (size, remoteness and average education) is always positive. We will pursue this 
implication in the empirical part of the paper. 
 
 
3. DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
 
In the rest of the paper we test the implications of the model. The source of our data is the Spanish 
Encuesta de Estructura Salarial for 2002 (Wage Structure Survey, EES-2002). This survey is 
conducted by the Spanish National Institute of Statistics (INE) following a two-stage stratified 
sampling methodology. In the first stage, establishments with at least ten workers are stratified by 
economic activity, firm size and region. Agriculture and the public sector are excluded. In the 
second stage, workers at every establishment are randomly selected. The survey contains matched 
employer-employee data for more than 15,000 employers and 150,000 employees. 
 
The survey provides information about the region where the establishment is located, industry, 
group size, collective bargaining if any, and market orientation (i.e., main broad market for 
establishments’ output; it distinguishes between local, national, European Union and rest of the 
world markets). We exclude from the sample firms in industries that do not have any exporting 
establishment (building, production and distribution of electrical energy, gas and water, education, 
health, social work and other social activities, and personal service activities). This leaves us with 
a sample of 11,567 establishments from 36 three-digit industries (main subsections of the National 
Classification of Economic Activities) for our analysis on average education in establishments. 
 
The survey also provides information on the individual characteristics of workers randomly 
selected at every establishment, such as education, sex, age, years working in the current 
establishment, type of contract, full/part-time job, etc. In our analysis on wages, we further restrict 
the sample to male workers with full-time jobs and indefinite contracts.12 We also exclude workers 
who went through transitory labor incapacity or were included in job promotion programs. In this 
way, we isolate the establishment-characteristics effect on wages from other circumstances such as 
gender discrimination, positive discrimination policies, underemployment, etc. All this depuration 
brings about a sample of 35,602 workers and 9,120 establishments. 
 
                                                 
12 Spanish legislation distinguishes between temporary (or “fixed term”) contracts and indefinite (regular) 
contracts. Temporary contracts were introduced to promote employment. They can be readily terminated 
once the contract is over, and are mainly used to hire young workers in their first employment. 
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Table 1 reports the main descriptive statistics on establishments’ characteristics according to 
the EES-2002. Establishments whose main market is the EU or the rest of the world only add up to 
about 6.5-percent of the total. Most establishments have less than 50 workers (71.3-percent) and 
only 11-percent employ 200 or more workers. Although the percentage of workers with a college 
degree is 10.5, only 27.6-percent of the establishments in the sample include at least one worker 
with a college degree among their surveyed employees. The percentage of workers with a college 
degree in this last subset of establishments is 34.2. This suggests that the data on the fraction of 
college graduates should be treated as censored data. 
 
The relationship between establishment size and market orientation shows a very strong 
pattern: the fraction of establishments with the smallest size is monotonically decreasing in market 
remoteness. The opposite occurs with the other two size groups. Establishments selling most of 
their production in non-local markets employ more educated labor and a larger fraction of workers 
with a college degree. In particular, the fraction of college graduates in establishments exporting 
most of their output to countries outside the EU is almost three times higher than in firms selling 
in local markets. It may be surprising, however, the low average education and low fraction of 
college graduates in establishments exporting most of their production to the EU market, 
compared to establishments oriented to the national market. This may be due to a Spanish 
specialization within the EU in rather low-skilled industries, which in turn would be the 
consequence of having a relatively low endowment of college graduates within the EU (before the 
enlargement from 15 to 25 members in 2004). The econometric analysis in the next Section lends 
support to this hypothesis by showing that once we control for two-digit industries the average 
education as well as the fraction of college-educated workers in establishments selling most output 
to the EU is larger than in national-market establishments. 
 
Finally, establishments selling in more-distant markets tend to pay higher wages. Again, there 
is some exception, however, since establishments oriented to the national market pay the same 
average wage than those oriented to the EU market. Clearly, the higher average education in 
national-market oriented establishments may be the reason. The econometric analysis of Section 5 
brings about substantially different results in this respect. 
 
 
4. ESTABLISHMENT  CHARACTERISTICS AND EMPLOYEES’ EDUCATION 
 
In this Section we test whether larger establishments and establishments selling in more remote 
markets do employ workers with higher average education or a large proportion of college 
graduates. We use weighted least squares to estimate the following equation, where the left-hand-
side variable  is establishment-j employees’ mean years of schooling (or, alternatively, the je
 13
fraction of college-educated employees), and where the covariates of interest are dummies for 
establishment size and market orientation: 
 
(18)  ;32 6543210 jjWjEjNjjjj vZMMMSSe +++++++= ααααααα
 
S2 is a dummy for firms employing between 50 and 199 workers, and S3 for firms employing 
more than 199 workers. The dummies for market orientation are MN for establishments selling 
most of their output in the national market, ME for the European Union market, and MW for rest of 
the world (i.e., non-EU countries). The reference group in the estimation is establishments with a 
number of employees between 10 and 49 that selling most of their output in the local market. Zj is 
a vector of other controls that includes dummies for establishment location (17 regions) and 
dummies for establishment industry when noted (36 industries).  is the error term.  jv
 
Results are reported in Table 2. The left-hand-side variable for the results in columns (1)-(3) is 
employees’ average years of schooling. Column (1) shows that all variables are positive and 
statistically significant at 1-percent level, except ME. Since the type of good being produced is 
likely to be an important determinant of the demand for human capital and the optimal size of the 
establishment, we include dummies that control for industry in the specification in column (2). 
Industry dummies tend to increase the size and significance of the coefficients on market 
orientation. All the dummies for market orientation are now positive, very significant, 
quantitatively very important, and (statically) monotonically increasing in market distance, as 
predicted by the theoretical model. In particular, average education in establishments selling most 
of their production in the national or in the EU markets is about one year higher than in local-
market establishments; and it is 2.1 years higher in establishments exporting most of its production 
to countries outside the EU (average schooling in the whole sample is 8.9: Table 1). 
 
So far, the differences between local-market and national-market establishments have not been 
explored in the literature. As observed in the Introduction, the result that national and European 
market orientation effects are similar, and that the difference between local and national-market 
establishments is as large as the difference between national and World-market establishments is 
important, as it suggests that the main reason for the higher average education in exporting firms is 
not necessarily the consequence of the very fact of selling in international markets. According to 
our analytical model, the reason is a common underlying cause for both establishment’s 
characteristics (high average education and the exporting status), namely, high efficiency. In this 
respect, our results in this and the next sections are indicative that the difference in efficiency 
between local and national establishments may be as large as the difference between national and 
international firms. 
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With respect to establishment size, the two dummies become negative though not statistically 
significant in column (2). Thus, not controlling for establishment’s industry may bring about 
misleading results on the effects of market orientation and size. The non-significant results on the 
size effects suggest that there may be other reasons different from higher efficiency that also give 
rise to a larger establishment size (e.g., demand shocks or past efficiency; which may bring about 
a current large size if size is more persistent than efficiency, due to sunk investments, importance 
of self-financing, demand inertia, etc.). Our model implies that human capital should be greater in 
larger establishments only when this larger size arises from underlying higher efficiency. Large 
firms for reasons unrelated to efficiency may likely not employ workers with higher average 
education, but then they will also tend to fail to be oriented to non-local markets. Conversely, size 
may still be a signal of efficiency (and therefore bring about higher average education) in 
establishments oriented to non-local markets. We test this hypothesis in column 3 where we 
interact size with market orientation. Since the number of firms with sizes S2 and S3 that sell only 
in local markets is quite small (see Table 1) we pool them together in one single group. The 
coefficients for large sizes conditional on selling most of their production in national or 
international markets, are now positive and significant in column 3. Large national and 
international establishments employ workers with average schooling about 0.7 years higher than 
small national and international establishments (the coefficient for non-local establishments of size 
S2 is somewhat larger than the one for size S3 but the difference is not statistically significant). 
Note that the coefficients for market orientation not conditional on size experience only a minor 
reduction. In contrast, there is now a significant negative coefficient for large establishments 
selling mostly in the reference market (the local one). Therefore, larger establishment size per se 
does not imply greater demand for more educated workers (since there may be reasons for larger 
size other than higher efficiency) but only when combined with other characteristics signaling 
efficiency, such as non-local market orientation. 
 
In columns (4) to (6) of Table 2 we check for the robustness of our results using now the 
fraction of college graduates in the establishment as the left-hand-side variable. Since about 70-
percent of the establishments in the sample do not include interviews to college-educated workers, 
least squares estimates may be inconsistent due to censured data problems. We therefore estimate 
a Tobit model by maximum likelihood. The qualitative results are very similar to those already 
reported.13 Size effects become insignificant when including industry dummies in column (5), and 
turn out positive and significant again in column (6) when they are conditional on national and 
international market orientation. The most noticeable differences are that the coefficients on 
market orientation are now strictly increasing in distance as long as industry dummies are included 
in the equation, and that the negative coefficient for large establishments in the reference (the 
local) market is now not significant at 5-percent but only at 10-percent level.  
                                                 
13 Recall that the coefficients from a Tobit model do not reflect the marginal effects of the right-hand-side 
variables and therefore are not comparable with the LS estimates. 
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5. ESTABLISHMENT  CHARACTERISTICS AND WAGES 
 
We now test the model’s implications on wages. The wage equation is based on the usual 
Mincerian equation where the log of the employee’s hourly wage is a function of his education 
and potential experience. Accordingly, we include worker’s schooling years (Y), and potential 
experience (PE) which is defined as the difference between employee’s age and the expected age 
to complete his studies according to their official length. We also include tenure (T) which is 
defined as the number of years the individual has been working for its current employer. Then, we 
include establishment characteristics already used in the previous section: two dummies for firms’ 
size (S2 and S3), three dummies for market orientation (MN, ME and MW) and a vector Zj of other 
controls (35 dummies for three-digit industries, and 16 dummies for regions). Finally, we also 
include coworkers’ average years of schooling (e).14 Thus the wage equation is: 
 
(19)  
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where wij is worker i’s hourly wage in establishment j, and uij is the residual. We also estimate an 
equation with establishment fixed effects jπ , 
 
(20)  ,')('')(''''ln 254
2
3210 ijjijijijijijij uTTPEPEYw +++++++= πββββββ
 
which are then regressed on firm characteristics (see equation (21) below). The data used 
correspond to the sub-sample of men with full-time job and indefinite contracts as described in 
Section 3. 
 
5.1. Main Results 
 
Results are reported in Table 3. In columns (1)-(4) we estimate equation (19) using weighted 
least squares and adding successively different establishment characteristics. In the specification in 
column (1) we only include workers’ characteristics (schooling, potential experience, and tenure) 
and the dummies for regions that control for geographical differences in factors such as 
unemployment, composition of labor supply, and price level. In column (2) we add establishment 
size dummies. In column (3) we add coworkers average schooling, and market orientation. In our 
preferred specification in column (4) we also include 35 dummies for industries. 
                                                 
14 We also considered average potential experience of coworkers as a further right-hand-side establishment 
characteristic but always found it to be not statistically significant. 
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All the variables suggested by our theoretical model have the expected signs, are jointly 
statistically significant at the 1-percent level, and have an important quantitative positive impact 
on wages. Including establishment characteristics in the wage equation also gives raise to 
an important increase in explanatory power. Adjusted R2 rises by 21.4-percent in column 
(4) with respect to column (1) (note that specification in column 1 already includes 16 
regional dummies). According to estimation (4), workers in establishments whose main market 
is the whole country obtain average wages 10.5-percent higher than wages in local-market 
establishments. This wage premium rises to 18.1-percent and to 20.3-percent, respectively, when 
the main market is either the EU or the rest of the world. As with the analysis on establishments’ 
labor composition in the previous section, the wage difference between local and national-market 
establishment is at least as important as the difference between national and international-market 
establishment effects which so far has been the only one analyzed by the literature. Coworkers’ 
education also has an important quantitative impact. Increasing coworkers education by one 
standard deviation brings about a wage increase of 6.9-percent; and moving from an establishment 
in the 10-th percentile of the establishments’ distribution across employees’ mean education (5 
schooling years), to an establishment in the 90-th percentile (13.2 schooling years), increases 
worker’s wage by 20.8-percent. The establishment-size wage premium is 12.1-percent for size-S2, 
and 15.6-percent for size-S3, respectively. Comparing these coefficients in column (2) with those 
when we add the rest of variables in column (4), we observe that the estimated wage premium for 
size-S2 establishments falls by 30.4-percent, whereas the premium for size-S3 drops by 45.6-
percent. These large reductions make clear the importance of a joint estimation of all 
establishment-characteristics effects. Overall, the large quantitative wage effect of these 
establishment characteristics suggests, according to our model, that unmeasured skills have a 
considerable productive importance. 
 
Including all of our establishment characteristics also reduces the coefficient on worker’s 
years of schooling by more than one third, which is consistent with the common presumption that 
education coefficients partially capture the effect of unmeasured skills. Working in establishments 
with the good characteristics (those that our model associates with high skill sorting) may bring 
about a wage premium comparable to obtaining a college degree. For example, according to our 
estimates in column (4), working in a medium size (S2) establishment whose main market is the 
national market brings about the same wage premium (23.9-percent) over the reference group 
(small local establishments) than 5.2 additional years of schooling.  
 
In column (5) of Table 3 we report the estimates of the establishment fixed effects model of 
equation (20). To carry out this estimation we remove from the sample establishments where only 
one employee was surveyed, so that we have at least two observations to estimate each 
establishment fixed effect. Thus, the sample is now reduced to 33,646 workers and 7,164 
establishments. It is of no surprise that this specification brings about the best fit as measured by 
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the adjusted R2. Fixed effects are of little help in understanding the causes of wage differences, 
however. Thus, we now regress the estimated fixed effects jπˆ  from equation (20) on the 
observable establishment characteristics.15 In this way we can assess how much of establishment 
fixed effects can be explained by the observable establishment characteristics, and check for the 
robustness of our previous estimates of these effects. Hence we estimate the following equation: 
 
(21) .''''''3'2'ˆ 1098765 jjWjEjNjjjjj ZMMMeSS ηθββββββπ +++++++=  
 
Table 4 reports the results from this equation. Taking the results for the most comprehensive 
specification (column 3) as the reference, observable establishment characteristics explain 30-
percent of the variation in the estimated establishment fixed effects. All coefficients are 
statistically significant and their values are very similar to the corresponding models in Table 3. 
 
 
5.2. Robustness 
 
We now estimate the models in equations (19) and (20)-(21) using dummies for broad 
categories of education instead of years of schooling to control for employee’s education. HS is 
now the dummy for workers with completed secondary studies, and U for college graduates. Also, 
we now use the fraction of coworkers with a college degree (e2) instead of coworkers’ average 
years of schooling. Results are qualitatively very similar to those in Table 3 and are reported in 
Table 5 (specification in each column corresponds, respectively, to the same column in Table 3). 
Again, they show that being employed by an establishment with the good characteristics may be 
as important for worker’s income as formal education. For example, according to the results in 
column (4) of Table 5, a college degree implies a 31.1-percent wage premium over completed 
high school. This premium is only somewhat lower than the one obtained by an employee of a 
medium size (S2) national-market establishment with a fraction of college-degree employees that 
is one standard deviation above average (using as reference the wage of an worker with the same 
individual observable characteristics who works in a small local-market establishment employing 
just the average fraction of college graduates). 
 
Some alternative explanations have been suggested for the establishment-size wage premium. 
In Table 6 we include additional controls and interactions that help controlling for some of those 
alternatives. In column (1) we add a dummy for firm-level contracting (which is the likely 
mechanism that strong bargaining-power workers and unions in large establishments may use to 
                                                 
15 This two-step procedure to assess the impact of establishment characteristics is similar to the one followed 
in Abowd, Kramarz and Margolis (1999). 
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increase their wages).16 Firm-level contracting is highly significant. It increases average wages by 
7.6-percent and its inclusion reduces the coefficient on the S3-size premium by 2.5 percentage 
points. Yet, all the coefficients remain significant and quantitatively high (in fact, the coefficients 
for market orientation tend to be now somewhat larger). 
 
Second, internal labor markets have also been suggested as a potential source of higher 
average wages in larger firms. Large firms may provide better opportunities for internal promotion 
and more in the job training, which then needs to be rewarded to reduce turnover. Hence average 
wages may be larger for the same level of formal education. Notice however that these benefits 
would not be obtained by the employee from the outset, but only as time goes by working for the 
same firm. Therefore, this effect should show up as a larger payoff to tenure in larger firms. We 
test this hypothesis in column (2) by including interaction terms of tenure with S2 and S3. Only the 
interaction with the largest size turns out positive and statistically significant. Tenure in S3 
establishments is about 20-percent more profitable than in small establishments. Inclusion of this 
interaction term reduces the S3-size premium by 3.1 percentage points (thereby eliminating the 
previous small difference between the S2-size and the S3-size coefficients), and leaves almost 
unaltered the rest of coefficients. 
 
In column (3) we simultaneously include both the additional control and the interactions 
terms. The sign and size of the coefficients are similar to those in the previous columns, though 
only the coefficient for firm-level contracting retains statistical significance. Overall, the inclusion 
of these additional variables has only a minimal impact on the estimates for market orientation and 
coworkers’ education, and reduces the estimated premium for S3-size establishments by six 
percentage points. 
 
 
5.3. Establishment-Characteristics Effects by Education Groups  
 
Do establishment-characteristics wage effects show any pattern with respect to worker’s 
education? This is an important question because not only it helps understanding the wage 
structure but because –according to our model- it also provides indications about whether 
unmeasured skills are more valuable for high-educated or for low-educated workers. Furthermore, 
our theoretical model predicts that whatever the sign of the relationship between establishment-
characteristics wage effects and worker education, the sign should be the same for all 
establishment characteristics. There is a short literature exploring this issue for some of the 
establishment characteristics. This literature is hindered in part by lack of suitable data and obtains 
results that tend to run against the common hypothesis of a positive relationship between the 
                                                 
16 In the specific analysis on firm-level contracting, Card and De la Rica (2006) point out that firm-level 
contracting is more likely to occur where there is (or there was) a strong union presence. Our estimates of 
this effect are very consistent with their results. 
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establishment premia and education (see the next footnote). We investigate the issue by estimating 
equation (19) for each major education group. We include in the equation the additional firm-level 
contracting variable and the interaction size-tenure terms from the last subsection since they 
already proved their potential relevance and, as we will see, they have a substantially different 
impact depending on the education group. 
 
We divide the sample into three sub-samples: workers without completed secondary 
education, workers with completed secondary education, and workers with a college degree. 
Results are shown in Table 7. All the coefficients for the three establishment characteristics have 
the expected positive signs and are significant at the 1-percent level in all sub-samples. For each 
sample, the differences between the coefficients for the S2 and the S3 sizes are not statistically 
significant, and the coefficients for market orientation are increasing in the remoteness of the 
market whenever the differences are statistically significant.  
 
The differences across education groups in the estimated coefficients are sizable and follow a 
systematic pattern. All the establishment-characteristics wage effects are either increasing in the 
level of education or the difference across education groups is not statistically significant (this 
occurs in the comparison of the secondary and the university estimates of the S3 and the MN 
coefficients). For instance, the coefficients on coworkers’ average education and market 
orientation for college graduates double or even triple those for primary-education workers. To 
give a sense of the importance of establishment premia for wages of individuals with different 
education levels, we may consider the premium for an individual working in a S2-size 
establishment exporting most of its production to the EU and with employees’ average education 
in the 75th percentile of the corresponding distribution (the reference would be the wage of an 
individual working in a small local-market establishment that is situated in the 25th percentile of 
the average-education characteristic). An individual in an establishment with those characteristics 
obtains an average wage premium of 29.8-percent should he have not completed secondary 
education, and an average premium of 86.4-percent in case he has a college degree. These results 
suggest that unmeasured skills are considerably more important for high-education workers than 
for low-education workers. They also stand in contrast with most of the preliminary evidence 
available so far which has been obtained with a less rich set of data, variables and controls.17
                                                 
17 As already noted, there are very few papers so far exploring the issue. Following a somewhat less precise 
approach (using interaction terms between individual’s education and coworkers’ average education, instead 
of dividing the sample by education groups), Battu, Belfield and Sloane (2003) obtain that the establishment 
average-education wage premium is decreasing in worker’s own education in the UK, though they recognize 
that this runs counter to their theoretical prediction. Lallemand, Plasman and Rycx (2005) analyze the size 
wage premium and conclude that it is generally larger for blue-collar workers. To the extent that the blue-
collard versus white-collard comparison can be related to our education-groups comparison, their results 
would point in the opposite direction to ours. However, they do not control for firm-level contracting and 
the highly significant revenues to tenure that low-education workers enjoy in large firm, which seem 
responsible for a large share of the wage premium that low-education workers obtain in large firms. 
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The results on experience and tenure also warrant some comments. The wage impact of 
potential experience is sharply increasing in education. However, the impact of tenure (as 
measured by the general coefficient for the reference size group) is not. This pattern is reinforced 
by the results on the interactions between tenure and establishment size. Large firms are likely to 
offer better opportunities for internal promotion, learning, and on-the-job training, which should 
then bring about sharper wage increases over time. Nevertheless, the tenure-size interaction effect 
only emerges as positive and significant in the case of the least educated workers. For higher 
education individuals, the coefficients turn out negative and sometimes significant (note however 
that this does not mean that tenure has a negative impact on their wages since the sum of any of 
these interaction terms with the general coefficient for tenure is always positive). Hence medium 
and large size firms seem to make a difference with respect to internal promotion and training only 
for low education employees. College graduates obtain a very large reward to potential 
experience, but it is relatively less important whether this experience is obtained within the current 
establishment and within a small or larger firms. 
 
 
6. CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
 
The model in this paper explores the implications of optimal quality choices by efficiency-
heterogeneous firms, for the sorting of workers with different skills into firms with different 
characteristics. It provides a simple integrated explanation for the observed correlations between 
establishment characteristics (size, average education, capital/labor ratio and market orientation) 
and average wages conditional on measured worker characteristics. It also points out some 
implications about establishment characteristics and their labor composition and about the pattern 
that establishment-characteristics wage effects should show with respect to worker education. 
 
Our empirical results using Spanish employer-employee matched data are favorable to all the 
implications of the model, extending the available empirical evidence in several directions. Market 
orientation has a significant and quantitatively important positive effect on the demand for human 
capital that is increasing in market remoteness. Moreover, in non-locally oriented establishments, 
establishment size also implies higher average employees’ education. Size, main-market 
remoteness, average employees’ education, and firm-level contracting also have a jointly 
                                                                                                                                                  
Additional results not included in the Table 7 (showing that when not controlling for these effects, workers 
with the lowest education obtain the largest firm-size premium), suggest that these factors can be 
responsible for the difference between our results and those of Lallemand, Plasman and Rycx (2005). 
Finally, our results for the market orientation premium tend to contradict those of Schank, Schnabel and 
Wagner (2006) who obtain that the premium for white-collard workers is statistically and quantitatively 
almost insignificant and lower than for blue-collard workers. However, these results are not obtained using 
directly observed data but rely on using imputed data for white-collard wages. This casts doubts about them, 
even more when taking into account the evidence in Bernard and Wagner (1997) pointing out that white-
collard workers are the group responsible for almost all the exporting premium. 
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significant positive and quantitatively important effect on wages. Notably, the importance for 
labor demand and wages of market orientation does not only show up when comparing exporting 
and non-exporting establishments, as suggested by the literature so far, but when comparing 
national-market and local-market establishments. The differences in this last comparison tend to 
be as important as those in the first one. The establishment characteristics we include in the wage 
equation reduce the estimated education wage premium (which, as often suggested, may be 
capturing the effect of unmeasured skills) by more than one third.  
  
All the establishment characteristics we have analyzed are quantitatively important for the 
wages of all workers whatever their education level. However, they are not equally important. 
Establishment-characteristics effects are increasing (though sometimes not strictly) in workers’ 
education. In fact, the coefficients on coworkers’ average education and market orientation for 
college graduates double or even triple those for workers with only primary education. Thus, 
according to the interpretation suggested by our theoretical model, unmeasured skills are much 
more valuable for high-education workers than for the less educated. The combined effect of the 
most favorable establishment characteristics analyzed in this paper may double the wage of a 
college graduate with respect to working in an establishment with the least favorable 
characteristics. 
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Table 1: Establishment Characteristics: Descriptive Statistics 
 
Notes: Data source is the EES-2002 using the sample weights provided by the survey. Establishments’ size, mean years of 
schooling, and the fraction of workers with a college degree are calculated for the sub-sample of 11567 establishments in 
industries that have at least one exporting firm. The fraction of employees with a college degree and average education are 
first obtained for each establishment and then averaged across establishments. Average wages are calculated using the 
sub-sample of 35602 men with full-time jobs and indefinite contracts who did not go trough transitory labor incapacity 
nor were they included in job promotion programs. See Section 3 for other details on the sample. Standard deviations are 
in parenthesis. 
Distribution of Establishments: Main Market 
 
All Local National 
Interna- 
tional:E
U 
Internat.
:Non-EU
Mean years 
of 
schooling 
Fraction of  
employees 
with 
college 
degree 
Average 
wage  
(€ per hour) 
All 1 0.478 0.456 0.041 0.024 8.883   (2.920) 
0.105 
(0.20) 
9.57    
(6.60) 
 10-49 
workers 0.713 0.406 0.279 0.021 0.007 
8.596 
(2.847) 
0.085 
(0.195) 
7.499 
(5.049) 
50-199 
workers 0.173 0.050 0.104 0.010 0.007 
9.251 
(2.964) 
0.134 
(0.223) 
9.875 
(6.474) 
D
is
tr
ib
ut
io
n 
of
 E
st
ab
lis
hm
en
ts
: 
Si
ze
 
 >199 
workers 0.114 0.022 0.072 0.010 0.009 
10.119 
 (2.924) 
0.188 
 (0.244) 
12.375 
 (7.553) 
Mean years of 
schooling 
8.883   
(2.920) 
8.204  
(2.630) 
9.584   
(3.083) 
8.315   
(2.271) 
10.014   
(2.734)  
  
Fraction of  
employees with 
college degree 
0.105 
(0.20) 
0.058 
(0.16) 
0.155 
(0.25) 
0.063 
(0.12) 
0.171 
(0.24)  
  
Average wage  
(€ per hour) 
9.57 
(6.60) 
7.25 
(4.68) 
10.63 
(7.29) 
10.53 
(4.67) 
12.07 
(7.97)  
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 Table 2: Establishment Characteristics and Employees’ Education 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
S2 0.288**  (0.104) 
-0.002  
(0.102)  
0.110**  
(0.015) 
0.040**  
(0.013)  
S3 0.844**  (0.136) 
-0.141  
(0.139)  
0.223**  
(0.017) 
0.005   
(0.016)  
S2+S3   -0.507**   (0.159)   
-0.038*   
(0.020) 
MN
1.128**  
(0.090) 
1.094**  
(0.094) 
0.937**   
(0.106) 
0.179**  
(0.013) 
0.202**   
(0.012) 
0.176**  
(0.013) 
ME
0.043  
(0.147) 
0.999**  
(0.146) 
0.823**   
(0.154) 
0.073**  
(0.030) 
0.322**   
(0.028) 
0.294**  
(0.029) 
MW
1.546**  
(0.195) 
2.106**  
(0.180) 
1.877**   
(0.192) 
0.236**  
(0.034) 
0.462**  
(0.031) 
0.429**  
(0.032) 
(MN+ME+MW)×S2   0.727**   (0.193)   
0.106** 
(0.025) 
(MN+ME+MW)×S3   0.614** (0.207)   
0.071** 
(0.026) 
Adjusted R2 0.112 0.266 0.268    
Pseudo R2    0.126 0.300 0.301 
Observations 11567 11567 11567 11567 11567 11567 
Industry dummies No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Notes: In columns (1) to (3) the left-hand-side variable is average schooling years of the employees in the 
establishment. The estimation method is Weighted Least Squares using the sample weights provided by 
the survey. In columns (4) to (6) the left-hand-side variable is the fraction of college-educated employees 
in the establishment, and the estimation method is Maximum likelihood using a Tobit model and the 
sample weights provided by the survey. A constant and dummies for 16 regions are always included. 
Dummies for 35 industries are included only when noted. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. See 
Section 3 for details on the data source and sample. ** means significant at 1 percent; and * at 10 percent. 
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Table 3: Establishment Characteristics and Wages 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Employee 
Characteristics:  
 
  
 
Y 0.066**  (0.002) 
0.059**   
(0.002) 
0.042**  
(0.001) 
0.041**  
(0.001) 
0.042**  
(0.002) 
PE 0.026**  (0.002) 
0.026**   
(0.002) 
0.027**  
(0.002) 
0.025**  
(0.002 
0.026**  
(0.001) 
PE2/100 -0.033**  (0.004) 
-0.031**    
(0.003) 
-0.034**  
(0.003) 
-0.031**  
(0.003) 
-0.036**  
(0.003) 
Tenure  0.018**  (0.002) 
0.015**   
(0.002) 
0.014**  
(0.001) 
0.013**  
(0.001) 
0.014**  
(0.001) 
Tenure2/100 -0.020**  (0.005) 
-0.019**   
(0.004) 
-0.020**  
(0.004) 
-0.019**  
(0.004) 
-0.021**  
(0.004) 
Establishment 
Characteristics: 
   
  
S2 
 
0.160**   
(0.012) 
0.112**  
(0.013) 
0.114**  
(0.013)  
S3 
 
0.252**   
(0.019) 
0.179**  
(0.018) 
0.145**  
(0.017)  
e 
 
 0.030**  
(0.003) 
0.023**  
(0.003)  
MN
  0.096**  
(0.013) 
0.100**  
(0.013)  
ME
  0.162**  
(0.033) 
0.166**  
(0.022)  
MW
  0.170**  
(0.024) 
0.185**  
(0.026)  
Industry Dummies No No No Yes _  
Establishment Fixed 
Effects No No No No Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.392 0.432 0.455 0.476 0.724 
Notes: the left-hand-side variable is the log of the hourly wage. In columns (1)-(4) we estimate equation 
(22) using Weighted Least Squares and including different sets of establishments’ characteristics. In 
specification in column (1) we only include workers’ characteristics (years of schooling, Y, potential 
experience, PE and tenure), a constant and 16 dummies for regions. In column (2) we add dummies for 
establishment size. In column (3) we add dummies for establishment market orientation (MN, ME and 
MW), size (S2 and S3), and coworkers’ average schooling (e). In column (4) we also include 35 dummies 
for industries. In column (5) we estimate the fixed-effects model of equation (23). Robust standard errors 
are in parenthesis. They are corrected for heteroscedasticity and for the clustered sampling scheme. Data 
source is the EES 2002 using the sample weights provided by the survey. The number of observations is 
35602 workers and 9120 establishments in columns (1)-(4) and 33646 workers and 7164 establishments 
in column (5). See Section 3 for details on the data source and sample. ** means significant at 1 percent; 
and * at 10 percent. 
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Table 4: Regressing the Estimated Establishment Fixed Effects with 
respect to the Observable Establishment Characteristics 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
S2 0.164**  (0.013) 
0.105**  
(0.013) 
0.104**  
(0.014) 
S3 0.264**  (0.022) 
0.175**  
(0.022) 
0.149**  
(0.024) 
e  0.027**  (0.002) 
0.019**  
(0.003) 
MN
 0.087**  
(0.014) 
0.095**  
(0.015) 
ME
 0.148**  
(0.025) 
0.173**  
(0.023) 
MW
 0.177**  
(0.024) 
0.194**  
(0.024) 
Industry 
Dummies No No Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.191 0.258 0.299 
Notes: The left-hand-side variable is the establishment fixed effects 
estimated with equation (19) (they correspond to the results in column (4) 
of Table 3). The right-hand-side variables are the following. In column (1) 
we only include dummies for the 16 regions and establishment size (S2 and 
S3). In column (2) we add coworkers’ average schooling (e), and dummies 
for market orientation (MN, ME and MW). In column (3) we also include 35 
industry dummies. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. They are 
corrected for heteroscedasticity and for the clustered sampling scheme. The 
number of establishments is 7164. See Section 3 for details on the data 
source and sample. ** means significant at 1 percent; and * at 10 percent. 
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Table 5: Establishment Characteristics and Wages. Robustness Using Alternative Measures for 
Employee and Coworkers’ Education 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Employee 
Characteristics: 
 
 
  
 
HS 0.289**  (0.011) 
0.258**  
(0.010) 
0.212**  
(0.011) 
0.193**  
(0.011) 
0.140**  
(0.009) 
U 0.732**  (0.020) 
0.666**  
(0.020) 
0.481**  
(0.016) 
0.464**  
(0.016) 
0.425**  
(0.016) 
PE 0.029**  (0.002) 
0.028**  
(0.002) 
0.029**  
(0.002) 
0.028**  
(0.002 
0.028**  
(0.001) 
PE2/100 -0.040**  (0.003) 
-0.040**  
(0.003) 
-0.004**  
(0.003) 
-0.038**  
(0.003) 
-0.040**  
(0.003) 
Tenure  0.019**  (0.002) 
0.015**  
(0.001) 
0.015**  
(0.002) 
0.014**  
(0.001) 
0.014**  
(0.001) 
Tenure2/100 -0.021**  (0.005) 
-0.021**  
(0.004) 
-0.022**  
(0.004) 
-0.021**  
(0.004) 
-0.021**  
(0.004) 
Establishment 
Characteristics: 
   
  
S2 
 
0.163** 
(0.012) 
0.115**  
(0.013) 
0.121**  
(0.013)  
S3 
 
0.256** 
(0.018) 
0.182**  
(0.017) 
0.162**  
(0.016)  
e2 
 
 0.413**  
(0.049) 
0.395**  
(0.045)  
MN
  0.086**  
(0.012) 
0.092**  
(0.013)  
ME
  0.161**  
(0.028) 
0.150**  
(0.021)  
MW
  0.164**  
(0.024) 
0.158**  
(0.024)  
Dummies for industry No No No Yes _ 
Establishment Fixed 
Effects No No No No Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.404 0.446 0.474 0.496 0.724 
Notes: the left-hand-side variable is the log of the hourly wage. All columns correspond to the same 
models in Table 3, except that we now use dummies for broad categories of education (HS corresponds to 
completed secondary studies, and U to a college degree) instead of years of schooling to control for 
employee’s education; and that we use the fraction of coworkers with a college degree (e2) instead of 
coworkers’ average years of schooling. See the notes in Table 3. ** means significant at 1 percent; and * 
at 10 percent. 
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Table 6: Establishment Characteristics and Wages. Robustness 
Including Additional Controls 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Employee Characteristics:    
Y 0.041**   (0.001) 
0.041**   
(0.001) 
0.041** 
(0.001) 
PE 0.025**   (0.002) 
0.025**   
(0.002) 
0.025** 
(0.002) 
PE2/100 -0.031**  (0.003) 
-0.030**  
(0.003) 
-0.031** 
(0.003) 
Tenure  0.013**   (0.001) 
0.013**   
(0.001) 
0.013** 
(0.001) 
Tenure2/100 -0.019**  (0.004) 
-0.022**  
(0.004) 
-0.021** 
(0.004) 
Establishment Characteristics:    
S2 0.107**   (0.013) 
0.119**   
(0.017) 
0.115** 
(0.016) 
S3 0.120**   (0.019) 
0.114**   
(0.023) 
0.097** 
(0.017) 
e 0.023**   (0.003) 
0.022**   
(0.003) 
0.022** 
(0.003) 
MN
0.100**   
(0.013) 
0.099**   
(0.013) 
0.100** 
(0.013) 
ME
0.168**   
(0.022) 
0.164**   
(0.022) 
0.167** 
(0.022) 
MW
0.193**   
(0.026) 
0.187**   
(0.026) 
0.194** 
(0.026) 
Firm-level contracting 0.073**   (0.022)  
0.070** 
(0.022) 
Tenure×S2  -0.0003   (0.001) 
-0.0006 
(0.001) 
Tenure×S3  0.0024**  (0.001) 
0.0019 
(0.001) 
Adjusted R2 0.478 0.477 0.478 
Notes: the left-hand-side variable is the log of the hourly wage. All models 
include a constant, 35 dummies for industries and 16 dummies for regions. 
Estimation method is weighted least squares. Robust standard errors 
corrected for heteroscedasticity and for the clustered sampling scheme in 
parenthesis. The number of observations is 35602 workers and 9120 
establishments. See Section 3 for details on the data. ** means significant 
at 1 percent; and * at 10 percent. 
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Table 7: Establishment Characteristics and Wages by Education Group 
Notes. We use three different sub-samples of workers according to their education level: 
workers without completed secondary studies (primary), workers with completed secondary 
studies (Secondary), and workers with a college degree (University). The left-hand-side 
variable is the log of the hourly wage. Estimation method is Weighted Least Squares. All 
models include a constant, 35 dummies for industries and 16 dummies for regions. Robust 
standard errors corrected for heteroscedasticity and for the clustered sampling scheme are in 
parenthesis. See Section 3 for details on the data source and sample. ** means significant at 1 
percent; and * at 10 percent. 
 Primary Secondary University 
Employee Characteristics:    
PE 0.016** (0.001) 
0.027**  
(0.003) 
0.060**  
(0.005) 
PE2/100 -0.020** (0.003) 
-0.032**  
(0.007) 
-0.001**  
(0.013 
Tenure  
0.015** 
(0.015) 
0.016**  
(0.003) 
0.015**  
(0.006) 
Tenure2/100 
-0.024** 
(0.005) 
-0.026**  
(0.008) 
-0.037**  
(0.015) 
Establishment  Characteristics :    
S2 0.107** (0.017) 
0.147**  
(0.028) 
0.167**  
(0.048) 
S3 0.091** (0.025) 
0.159**  
(0.035) 
0.133**  
(0.049) 
E 0.016** (0.003) 
0.028**  
(0.004) 
0.041**  
(0.009) 
MN
0.052** 
(0.012) 
0.136** 
(0.022) 
0.128**  
(0.041) 
ME
0.095** 
(0.021) 
0.208**  
(0.038) 
0.305**  
(0.073) 
MW
0.097**  
(0.022) 
0.214**  
(0.038) 
0.275**  
(0.068) 
Firm-level contracting 
0.085** 
(0.024) 
0.055*  
(0.029)  
0.062    
(0.039) 
Tenure×S2 0.002*  (0.001) 
-0.003*  
(0.002) 
-0.009**  
(0.004) 
Tenure×S3 0.005** (0.001) 
-0.002    
(0.002) 
-0.006   
(0.005) 
Number of  Establishments 7466 3966 1856 
Number of workers 21705 9594 4303 
Adjusted R2 0.443 0.399 0.332 
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